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IN THE SUPREIVIE COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLARK EQUIPMENT CREDIT 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent_, 
vs. 
T RAN S P 0 R T EQUIPMENT 
CENTER, I N C., a corporation, 




STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 
9637 
Although originally joined with a different action 
by a different plaintiff, the actions were separately con-
sidered. The appeal before the court in this case No. 
9637 arises out of an action by Clark Equipment Credit 
Corporation against Transport Equipment Center, Inc., 
on a promissory note, and against John N. Galanis, 
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Dena Galanis, Nick Galani~, Nora Galanis, 1Ponald 
H. Moyes, and Betty Moyes, on their guaranties of 
that note. 
Only Clark Equipment Credit Corporation is a 
respondent in this appeal. Clark Equipment Company 
is a respondent in another pending appeal arising out 
of the same case below. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondent agrees with appellants' statement. 
The $110,927.36 for which the judgment was entered, 
however, was in accordance with a supple1nental com-
plaint file~ by the plaintiff on September ·It>, 1961 
( R. 77-79) , and is based upon an agreed figure as. to the 
amount of interest paid (Stipulation dated June 26, 
1962, forwarded as a supplement to the record and filed 
in this court on July 19, 1962). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
From appellants' statement it is not clear who seeks 
what. On February 28, 1962, Nick Galanis and Nora 
Galanis filed a notice of appeal (R. 17 4) which was sub-
sequently dismissed by this court on those appellants' 
motion. On March 19, 1962, the remaining defendants 
filed a· notice· of appeal (R. 177), but ·only Transport 
Equip1nent Center, Inc., John N. Galanis, and Dena 
Galanis are now' shown in the appellants' brief as appel-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' statement of facts is too abbreviated 
to show the issues as prescribed to the trial court, or the 
basis for the trial court's judgment; and some state-
ments purporting to be statements of fact are statements 
of the pleadings- proved by subsequent discovery to 
be unfounded. 
The Pleadings 
A review of the pleadings will contribute to an 
understanding of occurrences in the court below. ( Inas-
much as Nick Galanis and Nora Galanis, two of the 
guarantors on the revolving credit note, have hereto-
fore dismissed their own appeal, we will refer only to 
the issues as made between the plaintiff corporations 
and the defendants pursuing the appeal.) 
The complaint (R. 1-3) contained two separate 
and distinct claims. The first was by Clark Equipment 
Credit Corporation ("Credit") against all of the defen-
dants on a "revolving credit note" (R. 104) which in-
corporated a "revolving credit agreement" (R. 94-101). 
The claims against the individual defendants were based 
upon an unconditional guaranty of payment (R. 105). 
The second claim was by Clark Equipment Com-
pany ("Clark") against Transport Equipment Center, 
Inc. ("T.E.C."), on an open account. Clark Equipment 
Credit Corporation and the individual defendants were 
not involved in this claim. 
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One answer was filed by Nick Galanis and Nora 
Galanis (R. 12-15) another (with counterclaim_) by the 
remaining defendants (R. 16-21). The latter, answer 
raised the following defenses: failure to state a claim; 
denial of maturity; waiver; and estoppel. 
The counterclaim had two "causes of action.'' The 
first, asserted only against Clark, alleged breaches of the· 
T.E.C. dealer agreement (R. 117-124) with respect to 
warranties, delivery dates, and specifications. Para-
graph 5 of the counterclaim stated: "That the plaintiff, 
Clark Equipment Company, is liable to the counter-
claimant, Transport Equipment Center, Inc., .in a sum 
of·money exceeding $35,000.00 on account of the ·said 
breach of representation, warranty and failure to com-
ply with specifications." Defendants asked for judg-
ment against Credit, but there was no averment that 
Credit was liable to T.E.C. in any amount by virtue of 
the matters complained of in the first cause of action. 
The second cause of action, by T.E.C. against both 
Credit and Clark, claimed a breach of a "dealer invest-
ment plan" agreement dated Decen1ber 28, 1960. 
T.E.C. sought damages "exceeding $100,000," arid 
asked that the court award judgment "in an amount 
determined by the court to represent the damage sus-
tained by the counterclaimant under the second cause 
of action of the counterclaim for breach of contract." 
In a .reply ( R. 24-37) the plaintiffs denied the 
essential averments of the first cause of action and, with 
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respect to the second cause of action, alleged failure to 
perform conditions precedent, repudiation, and estoppel. 
In an amended answer (R. 66-68) defendants 
raised an additional defense to enforcement of the 
note- "duress and economic con1pulsion." The defense 
is set out in its entirety in appellants' brief, pages 5-8. 
The duress relied upon- briefly stated, consisted of 
misrepresentation as to what the agreement contained; 
sl~w delivery of trailers; improperly built trailers; re-
fusal to negotiate ; threat to "take over" the business ; 
refusal to permit T.E.C. to handle other makes of 
trailers; and. delay in negotiation of settlement of claims. 
These things adversely affected the economic condition. 
of T.E.C. and "caused" it to enter into the revolving 
credit agreement. 
A supplemental complaint (R. 77-79) alleged 
additional defaults by T.E.C. under the note (failure to 
pay principal and interest and ceasing to be a dealer 
for Clark) since the filing of the complaint and asked 
for interest accrued and to accrue prior to judgment. 
Established Facts 
The statement by appellants gives the impression 
that the action had hardly begun when the respondents, 
on the basis of the pleadings, sought and obtained a 
su1umary judgment. The fact is, the action was begun 
on January 27, 1961, and thereafter for approximately 
10 months the parties were engaged in extensive dis-
covery work. Respondents took the depositions of the 
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principal defendants, and obtained answers to in-
terrogatories and admissions relating to the conduct of 
the parties and to the documents. The case was· more 
than a year old when the trial court granted a summary 
judgment in favor of Clark Equipment Credit Corpora· 
tion against all of the defendants on the revolving credit 
note and the guaranties. 
During the ten months of discovery it became ap-
parent that most of the material facts governing the 
revolving credit note were not in dispute, and that those 
in dispute were not, because of controlling legal prin-
ciples, material to disposition of the case. The following 
facts were established by the pleadings themselves: 
T.E.C. entered into the revolving credit agreem~nt with 
Clark Equipment Credit Corporation on or about 
November 23, 1959, at which time, and pursuant to the 
agreement, Credit lent to T.E.C. $100,000.00 and 
T.E.C. executed and delivered its 7 per cent note to 
Credit in the amount of $100,000.00. At the same time 
the individual defendants executed and delivered their 
unconditional guaranties of payment, Nick Galanis and 
Nora Galanis guarantying 50 per cent of the amounts 
due or to become due on the note, the other individual 
defendants guarantying 100 per cent. 
In their brief the appellants do not claim that they 
were not in default under the terms of the revolving 
credit note and that the amounts provided for in the 
note were payable unless the defense of duress and eco-
nomic compulsion was valid; they have abandoned the 
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defenses based upon waiver and estoppel, since they 
have not argued them in the brief; and the supplemental 
complaint shows that no effort was made after the bring-
ing of the action to keep payments on the note current 
or to make valid tenders, though conditional. It is not 
disputed that T.E.C. ceased to act as a dealer for Clark. 
Other established facts relating specifically to the 
claimed duress and economic compulsion will be set out 
in the argument. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
The facts admitted by the defendants-appellants 
in their pleadings, depositions, interrogatories and 
responses to requests for admissions show that there was. 
no legal duress or business compulsion which would 
affect the validity of the revolving credit note. 
In the appellants obsessive desire to theorize about 
corporate identity and interlocking directorates they 
have neglected to cite any cases to support their claim 
that the actions of Clark and Credit constitute "duress 
and business compulsion." And for the purpose of elimi-
nating arguments about irrelevant matters, we will con-
cede, for the purpose of this brief, that if the revolving 
credit note was given to Clark Equipment Credit Com-
pany because of the duress and (actionable) business 
compulsion of Clark Equipment Company, the defense 
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would be available as well against one as the other. This· 
follows without regard to corporate identity. Restate-
1nent of Contracts_, § 477 (a), 496. 
(The appellants' concern with corporate identity 
may be partly the fault of respondent. In support of the 
motion for summary judgment respondent relied, in 
part, upon an affidavit of John R. Wood describing the 
ways in which Clark and Credit are maintained and 
operated as separate corporations. This, however, was 
for the purpose of demonstrating to the trial court that 
there was no valid reason for refusing to enter a judg-
ment for Credit merely b~cause a counterclaim was 
pending against Clark. The trial court apparently 
agreed, and appellants' have not assigned this aspect 
of the case as error.) 
The essential point is that, under facts testified _to 
or conceded to be true by appellants, the conduct of 
Clark and Credit does not constitute duress or business 
compulsion. · 
The revolving credit agreement shows on its face 
and appellants acknowledge that it was executed in the 
State of Michigan (R. 100, Para. 6.4; John Galanis 
deposition, P. 55) . Accordingly, the law of Michigan 
governs a determination of whether the note is voidable 
for duress. See llestatement of Conflict of Laws_, § 
84~: 
"The law of the place of contracting deter:. 
mines whether a promise Is void, or voidable, 
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for fraud, duress, illegality or mistake or other 
legal or equitable defense." 
Moreover, the "law of the place of contracting" has 
been articulate, for the question of what constitutes 
duress has been considered in a number of Michigan 
cases, none of which can offer solace to appellants. 
In 1881 in Hackley et al. v. Headley~ 45 Mich. 569, 
8 N.W. 511 the Supreme Court of Michigan began a 
line of cases in which it has refused to set aside trans-
actions on the claim that one of the parties that he was 
"compelled" by force of circumstances to enter into the 
agreement. Headley had sued Hackley and McGordon 
to recover compensation for cutting, hauling and deliver-
ing logs, plaintiff relying upon a claim of duress to avoid 
the effect of a settlement agreement. The duress con-
sisted of the following: Headley claimed defendants 
owed him approximately $6,200.00. He went to the 
defendants' place of business and had an interview with 
Hackley who insisted that the estimate should be made 
according to a different scale and that the amount due 
was $4,260, more or less. Hackley stated that he would 
give Headley $4,000 or the partners' note for $4,000. 
Headley said he couldn't take it, that it wasn't right, 
and that Hackley knew it. Hackley replied "that is the 
best I will do for you." Headley said "I cannot take that 
}Ir. Hackley," and Hackley replied "you do the next 
thing you are a mind to. You can sue me if you please." 
Headley said he did not sue him because he had to have 
the money that day, couldn't wait for it, and would 
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probably be ruined financially because he had no othet 
arrangement to get the money. Finally, he took the note 
and gave the receipt, because at the time he could do 
nothing better, and in a belief that he would be finan-
cially ruined unless he had immediately the money that 
was- offered to him, or paper by means of which the 
money might be obtained. The Supreme Court of Michi-
gan reversed a verdict in favor of the pl~~t~ff, saying: 
"Of what did the· alleged duress consist in' 
the present case. Merely of this: that the debtors 
refused to pay on demand a debt already due, 
though the plaintiff was in great need of the 
money and might be financially ruined in case 
he failed to obtain it. It is not pretended that 
Hackley and McGordon had done anything to 
bring Headley to the condition. which made this 
money so important to him at this very 'time, or 
that they were in any manner responsible for 
his pecuniary embarrassment except that they 
failed to pay this demand. The duress, then, is to 
be found exclusively in their failure to meet 
promptly their pecuniary obligation. But this, 
according to the plaintiff's claim, would have 
constituted no duress whatever if he had not 
happened to be in pecuniary straits;. and the 
validity of negotiations, according to this claim, 
1nust be detern1ined, not by the defendants' con-
duct, but by the plaintiff's necessities. The same 
contract which would be valid if made with a man 
easy in his circumstances becomes invalid when 
the contracting party is pressed with the neces-:-
sity of immediately meeting his bank paper. This 
would be a most dangerous, as well as a most 
unequal doctrine; and if accepted, no one could 
well know when he would be safe when dealing 
10 
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on the ordinary terms of negotiation with a party 
who professed to be in great need." 
In Goebel v. Linn., 47 Mich. 489, 11 N.W. 284, the 
Supreme Court of Michigan relied on Hackley v. Head-
ley and reiterated the view that duress "in the refusal 
to keep the previous engagement" falls far short of 
legal duress. 
In Gill et al. v. S. H. B. Corporation., 822 Mich. 
700, 84 N.W. 2d 526, contractors had brought an action 
against an owner to recover the balance claimed to be 
due under a contract for the construction of dwelling 
houses on a cost plus fixed fee basis. One of the defenses 
was a settlement agreement, but plaintiffs sought to 
avoid the effect of the settlement agreement on the 
ground that they had signed the release in order to 
obtain from defendant money needed to pay subcon-
tractors and materialmen, which defendant refused to 
pay; that at the time they executed the release they 
had faced financial ruin in the event that defendant did 
not pay them the sums then due; and that they had 
served notice on the defendant that they elected to 
declare the release void. The Supreme Court of Michi-
gan upheld the trial court's ruling that the duress 
defense could not stand: 
"The duress or business compulsion which 
plaintiffs alleged caused them to execute the 
amended contract and release consisted of threats 
by the defendant to abandon the building project 
and failure by it to pay plaintiffs the sums then 
due them at a time when plaintiffs were desper-
11 
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ately in need of funds and faced financial rl!in 
in the event of their failure to collect. Relied 
on by plaintiffs is Vyne v. Gl~n~, 41 Mi~h. 112, 
1 N.W. 997, in which the plamhff therem, who 
was then involved in financial embarrassment, 
was induced by the defendant therein to give a 
receipt in full by threats to stop payments of 
money to plaintiff from other parties. The court 
held that the receipt was obtained under duress 
and was therefore void. To accept the plaintifl's 
contention that the Vyne case is controlling here 
would be~ in effect~ to hold voidable every con-
tract~ renegotiation or compromise settlement 
resulting from one party~s refusal to pay the full 
amount then claimed by the other party to be due~ 
particularly if the party were~ at the time~ finan-
cially embarrassed. Such it not the law.n (Em~ 
phasis added.) 
In Finn v. Miller~ 330 Mich. 396, 47 N.W. 2d 660, 
the court in rejecting a claim of duress arising out o~ a 
construction contract, said: 
"***The next three points boil down to this, 
that defendant failed to pay as originally and 
later agreed and failed to give plaintiff advance 
notice of his intention not to pay. There is no 
showing that plaintiff's financial distress was 
caused by any unlawful act on defendant's part. 
The four factual points raised by plaintiff do 
not suffice either individually or in combination, 
to establish the exertion by defendant upon 
plaintiff of such. dures.s as would entitle plaintiff 
to a decree setting aside the compromise settle-
ment of a disputed claim and a release from fur-
ther liability." 
See also M1Mial et uaJ. v. Yatzik et uaJ.~ 329 Mich. 
12 
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379, 45 N.,V. 2d 329, and Norton v. Michigan State 
Highway Department~ 315 Mich. 313, 24 N.W. 2d 132, 
in which claims of duress, based upon similar grounds 
to those stated in the instant case, were rejected by the 
Supreme Court of Michigan. 
To paraphrase thelanguage of the Michigan court 
in Goebel v. Linn~ 47 Mich. 489, 11 N.W. 284, supra, 
the conduct relied upon by appellants falls far short of 
conduct constituting duress. The cnnduct relied upon 
by appellants is set out in their answers (R. 137-141, 
165-169) to interrogatories (R. 82-86): 
In November, 1959, Clark Equipment Credit Cor-
poration "insisted on payment" of interest on trailers, 
"delivery of which had been cancelled by the defendant." 
Moreover, Clark Equipment Credit Company "arbi-
trarily deducted" the amount from the proceeds of the 
note and "refused any adjustment or compromise on the 
disputed claim." If Transport Equipment Center had 
not agreed to this the alternative would have been im-
mediate payment, which would have bankrupted T .E.C. 
(R. 165). T.E.C. was further told that the Clark 
account had to be paid, and if the indebtedness could not 
be paid, Credit would provide money for payment by 
means of the revolving credit note and agreement on 
terms insisted upon by the plaintiffs. These conversa-
tions occurred over a period of approximately 9 months, 
and during that period numerous conversations were 
held between the above named officials of the plaintiffs 
and John Galanis. After execution of the revolving 
13 
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credit note and agreement, no attempts were ever made 
by T.E.C. or the individuals to repudiate or rescind the 
agreement. During that time no suggestion was made 
respecting the revolving credit agreement and revolving 
credit note by plaintiffs and no threats with respect to 
such suggestions were 1nade by the plaintiffs. The defen-
dants did not repudiate or attempt to rescind the agree-
ment because they were "not in an economic or financial 
position to even suggest . a rescision or repudiation (R. 
137-141). 
The duress also consisted in Mr . .John Wood, Mr. 
Frank DeShon and Mr. Gordon Thorpe telling Trans-
port Equipment Center, Inc., that "if the money could 
not be raised to pay the indebtedness of the defendant 
Transport Equipment Center, Inc., to the plaintiffs, 
that he had no alternative but to sign" the agreements 
(R. 138). 
During the course of negotiations leading to the 
revolving credit note and agreement, the defendant 
T.E.C. and its officers believed uthat this arrangement 
might present a solution to the problemn and for that 
reason, they discontinued and failed to pursue other 
sources of credit which would have been available to 
place the defendant Transport Equipment Center, Inc., 
in a financial position to continue business without the 
execution of a revolving credit agreement and revolving 
credit note (R. 140). 
The reference to refusing to permit the defendant 
Transport Equipment Center, Inc., to handle other 
14 
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makes of trailers, has nothing to do with the revolving 
credit note and agreement. According to the answer to 
interrogatory No. 10 (R. 140), the conversation con-
cerning handling of· other trailers was not had until 
March 2, 1960, more than three months after the note 
was signed. In any event, according to the answer to 
-~nterrogatory No. 11, the statement was made in passing 
and no attempt was made by John Galanis to inquire 
further of the plaintiff corporation as to whether the 
statements of Gordon Thorpe represented the views 
of the corporation. It is clear from the deposition of 
John Galanis that Transport Equipment Center, Inc., 
was indebted not only to Clark Equipment Company, 
but to other lenders and sellers at the time of the exe-
cution of the revolving credit agreement. The company 
wanted some money and was willing to sign a note to 
get it. This was a far cry from duress. The following 
occurs in the deposition of John Galanis (Pages 26-32): 
"Q. Now at the time of the revolving credit 
agreement, did you have then some claimed ad-
justments with Clark? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. When you were discussing the contract 
did you talk about those adjustments at all? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Who did you discuss them with? 
A. Oh we discussed them-initially I discussed 
them with Mr. John Wood, who was then the 
acting general manager of the Brown Trailer 
Division; I discussed them with Mr. DeJohn 
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[should be DeShon], and we discussed them with 
Mr. Perrigo, who was then the branch manager 
of the Denver branch for Clark. 
* * * 
Q. What was the purpose of these discussions? 
A. Trying to arrive at a basic procedure for 
allowance of these trailers, processing of credits 
due use when the trailers were taken in, process-
ing of discrepancies between what we would ini-
tiate as a stated condition of the trailer, and then 
when the trailers were received maybe the tires 
were supposed to be 80 per cent good and they 
would arrive 20 per cent good, and such things 
like that. 
Q. And at the time of this revolving credit 
agreement, were you trying to arrive at some sort 
of balance between you? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Did you arrive at a balance then? 
A. Well after the discrepancy was broken 
down and rehashed and hashed and all the agree-
ments and disagreements were gone over, they 
arrived at a balance of a net owing to them of 
around $62,000. 
Q. Did you agree to that? 
A. Well- at that point they said, "this is what 
the balance is~ and if yon want to $100,000 loan~ 
to get everybody on a clean slate .. this is what we 
will agree to~ and I says~ '"allright .. · this is what 
we will agree to ... 
Q. And you understood that that was what you 
were agreeing to at that time? 
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A. That is correct. 
Q. And you did get the loan? 
A. Yes sir we got the loan. 
Q. How was that loan disposed of? What was 
that money used for? 
A. Well, in the revolving credit agreement, 
we, at the time of putting the loan into effect, 
were not to owe any large sums of money to any 
other loaning institutions that were . signature 
notes at this time. Prior to the writing of the note 
agreen1ent, we had, in order to maintain a normal 
course of business, borrowed one note of $14,000 
and one note of $9,000 from the Walker Bank, 
which bore no collateral- they were signature 
loans. We owed to a supplier in Los Angeles, 
which was our second largest supplier other than 
Clark, approximately $13,000, I _believe, on 
equipment that we had purchased from them that 
we had proposed to finance through Clark Credit. 
So, when the final accounting was arrived at, 
we owed Clark Equipment approximately 
$63,000, we owed Walker Bank approximately 
23 which would be 86, and 12 that we owed the 
Transi-Cold Corporation in Los Angeles which 
was about 98, so after paying off all our encum-
brances we ended up with about a net $2,500, I 
believe, out of the $100,000. 
* * * 
Q. But you did pay off those other substantial 
obligations? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So that at that time your only creditor 
would have been the Clark Equipment Company? 
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A. That is correct. 
Q. So you would start off clean as of the date 
of the revolving credit agreement? 
A. That is correct. 
* * * 
Q. Over how long a period of time was this 
revolving credit agreement negotiated? 
A. You mean how long were the negotiations? 
Q. Yes you were trying and talking the thing 
out? 
A. I believe we started negotiations on this 
in approximately August, and the negotiations 
were going on, audits and what not, up to and 
including the month of November when the thing 
was actually initiated. 
MR. ALLEN: This was 1959? 
Q. Did Wood Worsley [T.E.C.'s then attor-
ney] participate with you throughout these nego-
tiations? 
A. Some of them yes, where we thought it was 
necessary for him to be present. 
Q. And he looked over the agreements for you, 
did he? 
A. Yes sir. 
* * * 
A. Well, immediately following the credit 
agreement and the consummation of the same, 
we decided at that. time that if the two operations 
were kept on a strictly cash flow type of basis, we 
would never put ourselves in a position ,vhere we 
would be in this, you n1ight say, dire need again. 
In other words, we said that the two accounts 
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were now clean as a whistle on both ends. There-
fore, at the tenth of the following month, on any 
transaction that we might have with them, they 
would like to receive a check from us paying their 
bill, and by the same token, any charges or en-
cumbrances that we may have against them, they 
also at the tenth of every month would remit to 
us their check and we- Mr. DeShon and myself 
were very confident at that time that if this type 
of relationship were maintained that there would 
never be any reason for any discrepancies on the 
accounts or anything like that again." 
The description of the confidence, the relationships, 
the borrowings, the payments of other debts, and the 
anticipation of closer'working together between Trans-
port Equipment' Center, Inc., and Clark Equipment 
Company are entirely iuconsistent with the duress now 
claimed by appellants. The only "wrongful" conduct 
of which appellants complain is the failure of Clark to 
perform its contractual obligation, and a misrepresenta-
tion of the terms and meaning of a note and agreement 
that had been examined prior to execution of appellants' 
lawyer. 
The undisputed facts preclude appellants from 
establishing duress under Michigan law. Moreover, 
should the court decide Michigan law does not control, 
nevertheless there is no "wrongful" action of the type 
referred to in Fox v. Piercey~ 119 Utah 367, 227 P. 2d 
763. The law of Michigan corresponds with the law 
generally relating to duress, none of which helps the 
appellants. See Fr·uhauf Southwest Garment Co. v. 
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United States~ Ill F. Supp. 945; Inland Empire Refin-
ing Co. v. Jones~ 69 Idaho 335, 206 P. 2d 519; Oleet v. 
Pennsylvania Exchange Bank~ 137 N.Y.S. 2d 779. 
II 
The appellant.;;~ by failing to rep1tdiate the agree-
ments~ and tender the consideration received~ are bound 
by the terms of the note and agreements. 
The defense of duress and business compulsion was 
an afterthought in the first place - or second place. If 
there was any duress, it was certainly removed by J anu-
ary 27, 1961, when the action was brought by Clark 
Equipment Company and Clark Equipment Credit 
Corporation against Transport Equipment Center, Inc., 
and the individual defendants. There was then no longer 
any reason to acceed to any demands of the two com-
panies, or not to repudiate the revolving credit agree-
ment if it had been entered into by duress. The defen-
dants didn't repudiate the agreement. Moreover, they 
sought to enforce a subsequent agreement based upon 
a subsequent adjustment of accounts (including the 
revolving credit note) between Clark Equipment Com-
pany, Clark Equipment Credit Corporation, and Trans-
port Equipment Center, Inc., the dealer investment plan 
contract of December 28, 1960. 
On August 17, 1961 (or enough in advance of-that 
to permit drafting of a pleading) it finally occurred 
to the defendants that they had entered into the revolv-
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ing- credit note and agreement and guaranties because 
of the "duress and economic compulsion" exerted upon 
them by the plaintiffs prior to and on November 23, 
1959. The defense was pleaded almost seven months 
after the respondents had done about everything they 
could do to the respondents·. They had initiated the 
action, had attempted to obtain appointment of a 
receiver for the property of T.E.C. and had terminated 
the dealer agreement. Notwithstanding this, Transport 
Equipment Center, Inc., had not until the filing of the 
amended answer,taken any steps to repudiate its solemn 
agreement, and has never yet tendered the consideration 
received from Credit. 
Rules set out in the Restatement of Contracts are 
representative of court decisions as to the power to avoid 
a contract entered into because of duress: 
"§499. (I) Except as stated in sub-section (2), 
the power of avoidance and the remedies of an 
injured party where the transaction is voidab~e 
for duress *** are the same, and are subject to 
the same conditions as where a transaction is 
voidable for fraud under the rules stated in sec-
tions 482-484. 
" ( 2) '¥here a transaction is voidable on 
account of duress or undue influence *** the 
power of avoidance is not lost while the circum-
stances that rendered the transaction voidable 
continue to exist. 
"§ 482. Where an offer to return perform-
ance received by a party injured by fraud or mis-
representation is necessary to avoid a transaction 
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and such an offer is made and rejected, in order 
for the avoidance to remain effective, he must 
hold for the other party what he has receiv:d 
and refrain from exercising acts of ownership 
over it.*** 
"§483. ( 1) The power of avoidance * * * is 
lost if after acquiring knowledge thereof the in-
jured party unreasonably delays manifesting to 
the other party his intention to avoid the trans-
action.*** 
"§484. The power of avoidance *** is lost if 
the injured party after acquiring knowledge of 
the fraud or misrepresentation manifests to the 
other party to the transaction an intention to 
affirm it, or exercises dominion over things restor-
ation of which is a condition to his power of avoid-
ance, except as stated in section 482." 
In this case it is admitted by the deposition of the 
President of Transport Equipment Center, Inc., that 
at the time of executing the revolving credit note T.E.C. 
received from Clark Equipment Credit Corporation 
approximately $38,000 in excess of credits given to 
Transport Equipment Center, Inc., in payment of the 
"agreed indebtedness" of T.E.C. to Clark. There was 
never any effort on the part of Transport Equipment 
Center to return the consideration received by it at the 
time of signing the revolving credit note. Under the 
cases, there wasn't any duress. If there was, T.E.C. 
asserted it too late. 
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III 
On the basis of facts obtained from the defendants 
themselves J the trial court was duty-bound to enter a 
summary judgment for the plaintiff. 
The facts presented to the trial court as a basis for 
the motion for summary judgment (except for the 
affidavit of John R. Wood) were facts obtained from 
the defendants themselves, in pleadings, depositions, 
requests for admissions, and interrogatories. The appel-
lants have not indicated that they have evidence of a 
different quality than that presented to the trial court, 
but they argue that a summary judgment is a "drastic" 
remedy which should not be hnposed when "fact issues" 
are raised by the pleadings. 
The cases don't support the appellants' anguished 
cry. Under applicable law, the defense of duress is not 
and cannot be made out on the basis of the facts relied 
upon by appellants. 
A litigant cannot avoid the effectiveness of the 
summary rule by being a profuse or articulate pleader. 
Regardless of what he says in his pleadings, if facts 
obtained from him in the discovery process discredit 
the pleadings, the opposing party may be entitled to a 
summary judgment. As this court said in Continental 
Bani£ and Trust Cornpan;IJ v. Cunningham} et al.J 10 
Utah 2d 329, 353 P.2d 168, 
"That the counterclailn's allegations were in-
consistent with the facts developed under the 
discovery process did not impel a finding that 
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there was a fact issue that must have been pre-
sented to an arbiter of the facts. Under Rule 
56 (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, having 
to do with summary judgment, the facts pleaded 
in the counterclaim created a situation something 
akin to a presumption that dis3:ppears o;n ~ro­
duction of indisputable or adrmtted antitheiCal 
facts. The rule permits an excursion beyond the 
pleading. If facts discovered in the journey 
. irrefutably disprove facts pleaded, summary 
judgment is appropriate on motion therefor. 
The rule has been interpreted more articulately 
by eminent authorities on the subject who sug-
gest that the rule permits us to pierce the plead-
ing, resulting in a summary judgment, if an 
examination of facts developed under the dis-
covery procedure, by affidavit, deposition, ad-
mission or the like, makes it appear that no 
genuine issue of the fact is presentable. To 
travel beyond that point would be a waste of 
time, energy and cost. The rule designedly 
seeks to eliminate protraction, absent issues of 
fact, expediting litigation in an area where pos-
sible congested calendars point up the truism 
that justice delayed is justice denied." 
That the trial court can grant a summary judgment 
on the basis of admissions or state1nents of the party 
against whom summary judgment is granted is made 
clear in the case of Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn_, et al._, 
13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P .2d 266. 
We have no argument with the rule stated by the 
appellants, followed by the court in the. May case, that 
in order to justify a summary judgment the pleadings, 
evidence, ad1nissions and inferences therefro1n, viewed 
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1nost favorably to the loser, must show that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact, and that the winner 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law; that such 
showing must preclude, as a matter of law, all reason-
able possibility that the loser could win if given a trial. 
Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center .. Inc ... 
11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559, cited by appellants in sup-
port of their claim that a summary judgment was im-
proper, used language similar to that in the May Com-
pany case, and was itself a case in which the action of 
the trial court in awarding sununary judgment was 
upheld by the court. The court had looked past the 
pleadings and held the appellant to his statements in 
depositions and other discovery. 
As pointed out by this court in Ulibarri v. Chris-
tenson .. et al ... 2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P.2d 170, in those 
instances in which the trial court is convinced that no 
reasonable finder of fact could find that the burden of 
establishing the case (or defense) "then it was his duty 
to rule as a matter of law" that the claim of defense did 
not exist. 
The same point of view is expressed in Abdulkadir 
v. Western Pacifiic Railroad Company .. 7 Utah 2d 53, 
318 p .2d 339: 
"We are in accord with the idea that the right 
of trial by jury should be scrupulously safe-
guarded. This, of course, does not go so far as 
to require the submission to a jury of issues of 
fact merely because they are disputed. If they 
would not establish a basis upon which plaintiff 
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could recover no matter how they were resolved, 
it would be ~seless to consume time, effort and 
expense in trying them, the savi!lg of which is 
the very purpose of summary Judgment pro-
cedure. The pertinent inquiry is whether under 
any view of the facts the plaintiff could recover. 
It is acknowledged that in the face of a motion 
for dismissal on summary judgment, the plain-
tiff is entitled to have the trial court, and this 
court on review, consider all of the evidence 
which plaintiff was able to present, and every 
inference and intendment fairly arising there-
from in the light most favorable to him." 
But viewing things "in the light most favorable to" 
appellants does not require the trial court to ignore 
plain mandates of court rulings concerning the kinds 
of conduct necessary to constitute duress or business 
compulsion. In this case it is clear that the actions 
relied upon by the appellants to establish duress and 
business compulsion are actions which do not, in law, 
constitute duress or business compulsion. The most 
respondent (or its parent corporation, Clark Equip-
ment Company) could be said to have done was to fail 
to live up to its bargains. The cases discussed under 
Point II of the argument show that this kind of conduct 
is not duress. 
Moreover, taking the testiinony of the appellants 
the1nselves, and the record in this court action, it is clear 
that the defendants took no steps to bring themselves 
within the rule requiring a repudiation of the trans-
action or returning to the other party the consideration 
received. It is undisputed that the appellant corporation 
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received $38,000 over and above the a1nounts paid to 
Clark Equip1nent Co1npany by Clark Equipment Credit 
Corporation on Clark's claims against T.E.C. As far 
as we know, it still has the $38,000 and intends t to 
keep it. 
In sum1nary, this court has considered the su.rnrllai~Y 
judgment rule many times and it would serve no purpose 
to discuss all of the cases in which the court has approved 
the rendition of a summary judgment or reversed the 
denial of a sunurtary judgment. The court did one or 
the other, however, in each of the following cases: 
Morris v. Farnsworth Motet 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 
297; Matievitch v. Hercules Powder Company~ 3 Utah 
283, 292 P~2d 1004; Holland v. Columbia Iron Mi1ting 
Company~ 4 Utah 2d 303~ 293 P.2d 700; Reese v. Mur.:. 
ray Board of Edu£ation~ 6 Utah 2d 196, 310 P.2d 387; 
and Aetna Loan Company v. Fidelity & Deposit Co1n-
pany~ 9 Utah 2d 412, 346 P.2d 1078. 
CONCLUSION 
. The claim of. appellants that they were denied 
their day in court is overwhelmed by a record that 
shows the defendants. to have been given every oppor-
tunity, from the time of filing the complaint until 
argument of the motion for summary judg1nent many 
Inonths later, to produce some material evidence or 
respectable contention relating to duress and. business 
cmnpulsion. The only things they came up with were 
activities which do not, under the law of Michigan ( 01~ 
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any other state), constitute duress or business compul-
sion. The claim is that respondent and its parent 
promised to.do things but didn't do them, e.g., that the 
corporations promised to build trailers according to 
specifications but didn't; that they promised to deliver 
according to particular schedules but didn't; and that 
they promised to make adjustments for breaches of their 
own contracts but didn't. These breaches of contract 
are said to have put the appellants into a position in 
which it was necessary for them to sign the revolving 
credit note and agreement. But these activities don't 
constitute duress or business compulsion. 'Vhen John 
Galanis went back to Buchanan, Michigan, to obtain 
the loan, the only "duress" exercised against him then 
and there was that the company told him if Transport 
Equipment Center, Inc., wanted the money, it would 
have to agree to the adjustments proposed, sign the 
note, and obtain the guaranties. 
The evidence is conclusive that neither the re-
spondent nor its parent corporation exerted the kind 
of force upon the appellants that comes within any 
legal definition of duress. If breaches of contract 
occurred, they were collateral to, not part of the note 
transaction. Under the circumstances, it would have 
been a waste of time to set up for trial an issue relating 
to duress and business compulsion. A jury would have 
had to be directed to bring in a verdict as to the affirm-
tive defense of duress and business compulsion. The 
fact that there are cases like Holzman v. Barrett~ (7th 
Cir) 192 F.2d 113, cited by the appellants, in which 
28 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
there are triable issues of fact relating to duress and 
coercion does not help the appellants in this case for 
here there isn't any such triable issue. The paper 
defense interposed by the appellants in this case proved 
to be a paper dragon and got what was coming to it. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Bryce E. Roe 
Fabian & Clendenin 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
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